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Accommodating the Public Sphere:
Beyond the Market Model
Nan D. Huntert
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the Supreme Court faced
one of the classic conflicts in constitutional law: the tension be-
tween equality and freedom, between the right to belong and
the right to exclude. Previous cases had established that mem-
bership organizations had a right to expressive association pro-
tected by the First Amendment. By a five to four vote in Dale,
the Court held for the first time that compliance with an anti-
discrimination law would violate that right.
The extent to which the Dale decision will reach beyond its
facts is uncertain. It may portend a substantial rewriting of
previous expressive association law because the Court seemed
to lower the bar for how clearly an organization had to demon-
strate the tension between its ability to communicate its beliefs
and compliance with a civil rights law. Or it may be cabined by
the Court's subtextual reading of the sexuality and gender is-
sues that lay just beneath the surface of the case. Indeed, the
decision may be sub silentio contingent on those issues. At a
minimum, it weakens the claim to open participation in our
civic culture by lesbians and gay men.
This Essay has two major components. First, in Parts I
and II, I describe and critique the Court's opinion in Dale, be-
ginning with an examination of the social origins of scouting,
then proceeding to an analysis of Dale. Second, in Parts III and
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I wish to thank three groups
for their feedback and suggestions: my co-participants in the University of
Minnesota Law School Symposium on Expressive Association, the Cornell Law
School Feminist Legal Theory Workshop, and the Brooklyn Law School Fac-
ulty Reading Group. Special thanks to Susan Herman and Steve Winter. Two
of my students provided able research assistance: Anthony Brown and Chris
Fowler. A summer research grant from the school provided financial support.
In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I filed a brief amicus cu-
riae in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in support of James Dale, on behalf of
the Society of American Law Teachers.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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IV, I place the questions raised in Dale in another context in
which they belong but are seldom analyzed, that of the juris-
prudence of public accommodations laws.
In Part I, I describe how the Boy Scouts of America (BSA)
has been focused since its origin on concepts of citizenship and
specifically on an ethos of egalitarian masculinity as defining
citizenship. I then analyze Dale both as a contest between the
two fundamental principles of equality and freedom, and as a
contest over whether egalitarian masculinity is a contradiction
in terms. In Part II, I read Dale as an example of the Court's
inability to conceptualize and provide adequate reasoning for
its analysis of an expressive identity claim, an equality chal-
lenge in which the identity cannot easily be separated from a
message.
Beginning in Part III, I situate Dale in a broader context of
public accommodations laws. Public accommodations are those
intrinsically hybrid entities that are private as against the
state yet simultaneously open to the public. James Dale's
claim to retain his membership in the Boy Scouts was premised
on a New Jersey state civil rights law, which the New Jersey
Supreme Court interpreted to include the Boy Scouts within its
general definition of public accommodations. 2 Although that
ruling was not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court,
it is in many ways as meaningful as the expressive association
defense that the Court did adjudicate.
Part III examines how the meanings of public accommoda-
tions have shifted in response to the differing demands of
waves of civil rights movements. The result has been an exten-
sion of the definition of public accommodations to incorporate
subordinated groups in civil society. This has been achieved by
the adoption of an expansive concept of the market, including
services as well as goods, and intangible as well as tangible as-
pects of economic life. Part IV argues that this expansive mar-
ket model, which has become the new status quo, is incom-
plete. It perpetuates an outdated distinction between political
and social rights, and thereby misses important aspects of a
right to full participation in a democracy.
In conclusion, I join the two major themes by framing
Dale's claim as the latest in a series of cases that have invoked
an evolving understanding of citizenship. What is specifically
2. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1211 (N.J. 1999), rev'd &
remanded, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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at stake in Dale is the relationship between civic status and
gender and sexuality. What it illustrates more broadly is the
need for a contemporary social theory of citizenship that en-
compasses the discursive dynamics and power of the institu-
tions of civil society.
I. THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA AND THE
MEANINGS OF MASCULINITY
It is impossible to understand the fall meaning of Dale
without an appreciation of the history and cultural significance
of the Boy Scouts. What the Boy Scouts have always argued,
not in the courts but in the culture, is that their code of mascu-
line ethics virtually defines citizenship. The title of Lord Ba-
den-Powell's first publication was "Scouting for Boys: A Hand-
book for Instruction in Good Citizenship."3 There is probably
no private organization in the country which so promotes itself
as an icon of citizenship as the Boy Scouts.
Today, public schools, government agencies, and military
units operate hundreds of Boy Scout troops.4 Its sheer size is
impressive: there are approximately one million adult men who
serve as leaders in some capacity for a youth membership of be-
tween four and five million.5 In addition, its employees number
approximately five hundred. 6 With its slogan of "open to all
boys," it has become a symbol of egalitarian masculinity.
3. ROBERT H. MACDONALD, SONS OF THE EMPmE: THE FRONTIER AND
THE BoY ScouT MOVEMENT, 1890-1918, at 7 (1993).
4. Brief for Respondent at 2, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 340276. The Boy Scouts of America
(BSA) is intertwined with government agencies and the recipient of preferred
treatment in many ways. See id. at 3. In addition to sponsoring troops, mili-
tary units designate personnel to participate in scout activities and furnish
facilities for use by the BSA. See id. Off-duty personnel are specifically
granted the right to wear a Boy Scout uniform, the only civilian organization
statutorily listed. 10 U.S.C. § 772(j)(1) (1994). Other federal agencies are also
authorized to furnish supplies, services, and transportation for BSA use. 10
U.S.C. §§ 2544(a), (d) (1994). Involvement by state and local government is
also extensive, resulting in numerous efforts to rescind such involvement since
the Supreme Court's decision in Dale.
5. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1200.
6. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, COMPANY CAPsULE, at http'//www.hoovers.
com/co/capsule/2/0,2163,56152,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
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A. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SCOUTING
The Boy Scouts began with an accidental tourist experi-
ence.7 William D. Boyce, a wealthy American newspaper pub-
lisher, visited England in 1909 and became lost on the streets
of London.8 A boy came up to him and inquired if he could be of
help and then guided the man to his destination. 9 Surprised by
the lad's generosity, Boyce offered him payment.10 The boy re-
fused, saying that it was nothing more than his duty as a Boy
Scout.11
When Boyce inquired of British friends as to who and what
the Boy Scouts were, he learned that Lord Robert Baden-
Powell, a hero of the Boer War and the founder of the South Af-
rican Constabulary, the police force established by the British
after the war, had begun a boys organization that combined
concepts of patriotism with the lure of adventure. 12 Baden-
Powell had returned from the war disappointed with how un-
prepared his troops had been for the rigors of outdoor life and
fascinated with the role of military scouts, those individuals
who could venture ahead of a regular troop formation, survive
by their own skills, and provide intelligence on the enemy.13
British scouting was an instant success. 14 Boys joined be-
cause it offered camping and other outdoors activities, as well
as a diversion from parents and school.15 Progressive reformers
were attracted by Baden-Powell's emphasis on reaching out to
lower-class boys to rescue them from slum life.16 Conservatives
hailed the popularization of themes associated with imperial-
7. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK 251-52 (1990)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]; FOUNDERS OF SCOUTING AND THE BOY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA, at http'//www.bsa.society.orgfactsheets/02-211.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2001) [hereinafter FOUNDERS].
8. See HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 251-52; FOUNDERS, supra note 7.
9. See HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 251-52; FOUNDERS, supra note 7.
10. See HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 251-52; FOUNDERS, supra note 7.
11. See HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 251-52; FOUNDERS, supra note 7.
12. See generally TIM JEAL, THE LIFE OF LORD BADEN-POWELL (1990);
MACDONALD, supra note 3; MICHAEL ROSENTHAL, THE CHARACTER FACTORY:
BADEN-POWELL AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT (1986).
13. See MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 16-19; DAVID I. MACLEOD, BUILD-
ING CHARACTER IN THE AMERICAN BOY: THE BOY SCOUTS, YMCA, AND THEIR
FORERUNNERS, 1870-1920, at 133-34 (1983); ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 3.
14. MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 118-44.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 153-57.
1594 [Vol. 85:1591
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ism, and the intervention to curb any further feminization of
British boys, especially those in cities. 17
Boyce brought the concept back to the United States,
where it enjoyed similar success. The BSA was incorporated on
February 8, 1910.18 Congress chartered the organization in
1916,19 and by 1920, it had over 462,000 active members. 20
More than 1,325,000 American men and boys had passed
through the Boy Scouts during that first ten years.21 By the
end of the century, more than 90 million Americans had been
Boy Scouts. 22
The fundamental forces that powered the British Boy
Scouts also fueled the BSA. Middle-class men feared that boys
were "growing up weak," and "[mlanliness came.., to signify
less the opposite of childishness than the opposite of feminin-
ity. 2 3 The American context, however, led to a distinctive so-
cial discourse, one that stressed ethnic as well as class assimi-
17. JEAL, supra note 12, at 372-73; MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 13, 26;
MACLEOD, supra note 13, at 136-37; ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 197-200.
Emblematic of concern about feminization and the effects of effete urban life
was a popular reaction to the trial and conviction, a decade earlier, of Oscar
Wilde for gross indecency. See MACDONALD, supra note 3, at 16.
Wilde and other 'decadent' fin de siecle poets and artists had seemed
to threaten an entire culture with their self-indulgence and effemi-
nacy. Their antithesis was the ideal soldier living simply, ignorant of
art and intellectual matters, disciplining his mind and body and plac-
ing his love of country above all else .... And when such fears in Brit-
ain were at their height during the disastrous Boer War, no soldier
epitomized that saving manly spirit more perfectly than R. S. S. Ba-
den-Powell.
JEAL, supra note 12, at 570.
18. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1910S, at
http'//www.bsa.scouting.orgfactsheets/02-511/1910.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2001) [hereinafter HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1910S].
19. 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1994). Its original charter stated that the purpose
of the Boy Scouts was "to promote.., the ability of boys to do things for them-
selves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism,
courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues." 36 U.S.C. § 23 (1994). Pursuant
to this charter, the BSA files an annual report with Congress. 36 U.S.C. §§ 28,
1103 (1994). Among the rights granted under it is the right to bring or remove
litigation to federal district courts, regardless of whether there is diversity of
citizenship or a federal question in the claim. 36 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
20. See HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1910S, supra note 18.
2L See id.
22. See BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1990S, at
http'//www.bsa.scouting.org/factsheets/02-511/1990.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2001).
23. MACLEOD, supra note 13, at xv, 45 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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lation. The BSA took stronger early stands against racism and
anti-semitism than the British Boy Scouts, 24 and so developed a
philosophy of citizenship that simultaneously stressed equality
and locked in gender. 25
A central goal of the early organizers was to "Americanize"
immigrant and low-income boys. Although scouting is now as-
sociated primarily with suburban or small town youth, its ear-
liest focus was distinctively urban. The migration of the BSA's
national office reflects the shift. From their founding in 1910 to
1954, the Boy Scouts were headquartered in New York City.26
In 1954, they left the city and relocated the national office to
New Brunswick, New Jersey.27 Since 1979, the national head-
quarters has been in Irving, Texas, a suburb of Dallas.28 The
theme of national unity as a moral force suffuses the organiza-
tion's history of itself, published in 1937: "It is one of the few
nation-wide agencies which tends to 'pull us together' as
Americans," author William D. Murray wrote. 29 Its focus was
on the "needs of youth-such as Negro, American Indian, Mexi-
can,... [and] 'less-chance' boys who are one-fourth of the total
membership."30 From the beginning, the BSA rejected self-
description as a Christian organization. "In the 12th Scout
Law and its practice the young Protestant has become a part of
24. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 253-63, 267-78.
25. As to equality based on gender, of course the Boy Scouts is, by defini-
tion, only for boys. Baden-Powell responded to the interest of girls in a paral-
lel program, which he designed with home and family as the chief components
of female citizenship, and to which he gave a different name, Girl Guides.
JEAL, supra note 12, at 469-77. He tapped first his sister, and then his wife, to
lead the Girl Guides. Id. The first executive director of the BSA, James W.
West, strongly opposed formation of the Girl Scouts of America, although the
Girl Scout program was also highly gendered. MACLEOD, supra note 13, at 50-
51, 183-84. One point on which the organizations differ currently is their pol-
icy on discrimination based on sexual orientation: the Girl Scouts' policy pro-
hibits such discrimination. See SCOUTING FOR ALL, at http'//www.
Scoutingforall.org/aaic/122601.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2001) ("Other major
youth organizations, such as Girl Scouts of America,... do not have policies
against gays or lesbians.").
26. HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1910s, supra note 18.
27. BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1950S, at
http'//www.bsa.scouting.org/factsheets/02-511/1950.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2001).
28. BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: 1970S, at
http'//www.bsa.scouting.org/factsheets/O2-511/1970.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2001).
29. WILLIAM D. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
206 (1937).
30. Id. at 203.
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extending respect to the religious customs and dietary laws of
his Catholic and Jewish friends and vice-versa. Here has been
released a great force."31 This law--"A SCOUT IS REVERENT.
He... respects the convictions of others in matters of custom
and religion"-was not part of the British Boy Scout oath and
law.32
Murray is also explicit that the primary goal was assimila-
tion:
We recognized that the Indian boys, the Mexican youth along the Rio
Grande, the Negro lads in the South and in the northern industrial
centers were somewhat out of the stream of American boy life and
needed special aid. Also, there were foreign language and racial sec-
tions in our large industrial centers, which had imported their old-
world customs into little Italy, little Poland, and similar sections.
33
In response, the Boy Scouts hired a full-time staff member to
concentrate on this "missionary endeavor." 34
Murray's claims may have been exaggerated, but they were
not delusions. The BSA had Jewish leadership from its begin-
ning, including members on its board of directors.35 Although
small in number, there were synagogue-sponsored troops start-
ing in the early years of the BSA. British scouting was also of-
ficially "indifferent to religious preference,"36 but Baden-Powell
himself endorsed anti-Semitic views and, as late as 1937, the
Nazi Jugend program for youth.3 7
As to race, the story is decidedly more mixed. The BSA na-
tional office encouraged as well as condoned segregation as the
norm for troops. Gradually, however, the office began to con-
test the efforts of local councils in the South that attempted to
limit the program entirely to whites by chartering only all-
white troops; the office sought to organize at least some Afri-
31. Id. at 229.
32. Id. at 63. Part of the British Scout oath and law dropped by the
Americans read, "A SCOUT IS A FRIEND TO ALL, AND A BROTHER TO
EVERY OTHER SCOUT, NO MATTER TO WHAT SOCIAL CLASS THE
OTHER BELONGS.... A Scout must never be a SNOB." Id. at 61; see also
MACLEOD, supra note 13, at 137, 176.
33. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 388.
34. Id. "In negotiations with ethnic groups, Boy Scout officials showed
little sympathy for immigrants' desires to preserve their culture." MACLEOD,
supra note 13, at 215.
35. See MACLEOD, supra note 13, at 194-95, 198 (describing the relation-
ship of the early BSA to the Jewish community).
36. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 268.
37. Id. at 267-78.
1597
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can-American troops.38 By 1927, there was one such "experi-
mental Troop" in each of the southern states, and, in 1936, only
one council-in Mississippi-continued to block Boy Scout pro-
grams among African-American youth.39 The resistance to the
Boy Scouts as an agent of racial toleration is graphically illus-
trated in a map showing the density of BSA members in 1932.40
Mid to high levels of density cover every region of the United
States with one exception: the solidly non-welcoming South.41
Scouting leaders in Britain during this period may have
been most worried about class tensions and the portents of war
in Europe. In the United States, the challenge of ethnic and
racial assimilation in a culturally diverse nation loomed larger.
The Boy Scouts in the United States became not merely a sym-
bol of citizenship as they were in Britain, but an agent of citi-
zenship as well.
B. BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA V. DALE
Given the BSA's organizational history, and specifically its
tradition of tolerance, it is no surprise there are no reported
cases involving claims of racial or religious discrimination. The
earliest case filed under a civil rights law alleged sex discrimi-
nation, but was dismissed on the ground that the statute "was
not intended by the Oregon legislature to include the Boy
Scouts of America, at least to the extent of requiring it to accept
applications by girls for membership."42 Beginning in the
1980s, litigation based on sexual orientation claims began
against the national organization. 43 Every anti-discrimination
case except Dale led to rulings that the plaintiff lacked a viable
claim, mostly on the ground that the BSA did not fit the par-
ticular statute's definition of a public accommodation. 4
38. MACLEOD, supra note 13, at 212-14; MURRAY, supra note 29, at 388-
89.
39. MURRAY, supra note 29, at 388-89.
40. Id. at 285.
41. See id.
42. Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465, 469 (Or. 1976).
43. Other than Dale, the primary challenge based on sexual orientation
grounds was Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America,
first filed in 1981 and decided on statutory grounds seventeen years later. 952
P.2d 218, 236 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the BSA is not a public accommoda-
tion).
44. Three additional cases raised sex discrimination claims. See Yeaw v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 88-89 (1997) (holding that the BSA is
not a public accommodation); Mankes v. Boy Scouts of Am., 137 F.R.D. 409,
1598 [Vol. 85:1591
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In Dale,45 the Supreme Court reached the constitutional
questions, and ruled that New Jersey could not, through appli-
cation of its public accommodations law, force the Boy Scouts to
accept James Dale, a former Eagle Scout, as an assistant
scoutmaster.4 6 The Court ruled that the statute, as applied in
that way, would violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right
of expressive association.47 The Boy Scouts had expelled Dale
after an official of his local Boy Scouts council read a newspa-
per article in which Dale had identified himself as gay and as
copresident of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alliance.
48
The Court found that Dale's presence "as an assistant
scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints,"49 specifically the "desire
to not 'promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of be-
havior.'"50 The Court found that there was sufficient evidence
of the "sincerity" of the Boy Scouts' belief, despite a spotty re-
cord of its expression outside the context of litigation.51 It fur-
ther held that the centrality of a group's affected viewpoint to
its purposes or activities was not an important factor: "An asso-
ciation must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection."52
It is difficult to assess the likely importance of this deci-
sion. In part that is because both parties seem singular. In
American cultural geography, the BSA occupies the intersec-
tion of childhood, citizenship, and masculinity; it is unique in
its symbolic status as proxy for good citizenship. Invocations to
411-12 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding no subject matter jurisdiction); Quinnipiac
Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 528
A.2d 352, 360 (Conn. 1987) (holding that the Boy Scout Council is not excluded
from public accommodations law, but that not allowing a female scoutmaster
is not a discriminatory practice). Three others were brought by atheists, alleg-
ing discrimination based on religion. See Randall v. Orange County Council,
Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 266 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the BSA is not
a public accommodation); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of
Am., 891 P.2d 385, 406 (Kan. 1995) (same); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993
F.2d 1267, 1275 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).
45. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
46. Id. at 2458.
47. Id. at 2457.
48. Id. at 2449.
49. Id. at 2452.
50. Id. at 2453 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2454.
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"be a good Scout" are part of the vernacular. Dale's homosexu-
ality transports him also into a category that courts repeatedly
treat as resistant to analogy. As I shall argue later, the appar-
ent singularity of each party is descriptive, and functions as
one of the fundamental cultural dynamics driving the decision.
Assessing future importance is also made difficult by a cer-
tain duality in the opinion, which reads as both carefully lim-
ited and dangerously expansive. The text is fairly terse; the
primary dissent is more than twice as long as the opinion of the
Court. That terseness produces both an easy road map to the
Court's logic, and elisions and logical lapses at critical points.
Overall, I would identify four principles as central to the deci-
sion, two with a narrowing effect and two with much broader
ramifications. After discussing each of those principles, I will
briefly describe the dissents.
First, in a series of questions and conclusions that lead up
to its holding, the Court repeatedly specifies that it is ruling on
the case presented by someone who would assume a leadership
role in the organization: "the forced inclusion of Dale as an as-
sistant scoutmaster";53 "Dale's presence as an assistant scout-
master";54 and, finally, "requir[ing] that the Boy Scouts retain
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster."55 There is no declaration
that membership alone (for example, that of a gay adolescent
Boy Scout) would violate expressive association rights of an or-
ganization with several million members. The reasoning of the
Court is grounded on the impairment to the Boy Scouts' ex-
pressive activities caused by an adult leader, a person charged
with "inculcating [boys with the] Boy Scouting's values."56
The Court uses the term "member" infrequently in its legal
reasoning, primarily in its discussion of precedent. Prior case
law had concerned only adult membership groups, and had
drawn no distinction as to leadership. The penultimate para-
graph states that New Jersey cannot "compel the organization
to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from
the organization's expressive message."57 That sentence pro-
vides that mere membership could be the question presented,
53. Id. at 2452 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 2453 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 2457 (emphasis added).
56. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228616.
57. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2458.
1600 [Vol. 85:1591
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as indeed it was in the three earlier club cases58 that estab-
lished this branch of expressive association doctrine. But it
does not undo the specificity of the Court's reasoning in this
case. The introductory paragraph refers to Dale's "adult mem-
bership,"59 but that is a somewhat misleading term since the
only way that an adult can be a member of the Boy Scouts is to
be a troop leader.60
In a carefully parsed decision in New Jersey's intermediate
appellate court, Justice Landau reasoned that the Boy Scouts'
expressive association rights entitled them to expel openly gay
scoutmasters, but not openly gay Boy Scouts.6 1 The United
States Supreme Court never addressed this possibility; its rea-
soning neither clearly accepted nor rejected this outcome. Con-
sistent with its current minimalist jurisprudence, the Court
appears to have left the second part of that question for another
day.
A second limiting feature of the opinion is its bypass of a
direct First Amendment holding. The Boy Scouts had argued
that, in addition to its expressive association rights, it had a
First Amendment speech right to exclude Dale, on the theory
that accepting him as a scoutmaster would amount to forced
speech.6 2 Direct infringement on speech was the basis of the
holding of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group,63 the case in which the Court ruled that St. Patrick's
Day Parade organizers could not be required to include a con-
tingent of marchers carrying a banner identifying them as les-
bian and gay Irish-Americans. 64 Although the Court in Dale
cited Hurley as "similar" and "illustrative,"65 it declined to rule
that Dale's inclusion would violate the speech rights held by a
58. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
59. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
60. See BOY ScouTs, at http'J/www.scouting.org/boyscouts/index.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2001) (indicating that only boys aged eleven through sev-
enteen can be scout members).
61. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 294-95 (1998) (Landau, J.,
concurring and dissenting), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. Aug. 4, 1999), rev'd &
remanded, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
62. See Brief for Petitioners at 20-25, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228616.
63. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
64. Id. at 580-81.
65. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2448, 2454 (2000).
1601
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much broader class of possible defendants than organizations
which satisfy the criteria for expressive associations. 66
A third aspect of the decision, however, which is its linch-
pin, weakens, if not erases, the limitation formed by the Court's
hesitancy to adopt a broader First Amendment holding. The
Court ruled that "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to
the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."67 The
Court essentially ruled that the Boy Scouts can selectively tar-
get the messenger, based on sexual orientation. Referring to
evidence that the Boy Scouts do not expel heterosexual scout-
masters who openly endorse the legitimacy of homosexuality,
the Court declared that "if this is true, it is irrelevant. The
presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist...
sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a het-
erosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagree-
ing with Boy Scouts policy."68
This superficially simple reasoning works to hide more
complex assumptions. One is the mispairing in the final sen-
tence of the "avowed activist" whose message of presence is im-
plicitly directed to the boys in the troop, contrasted with a
straight scoutmaster "who is on record as disagreeing with...
policy."69 "Activist" implies direct and continuing advocacy,
whereas "on record" does not. Both imagined speakers could be
quite activist; alternatively, both could simply go "on record."
In either case, the differential impact of the two messages be-
comes less clear.
There are other reasons why it is not self-evident that the
gay speaker would always be the most likely to "derogate from
the organization's.., message."70 For example, a statement
made by a white person, during the 1950s in the South, oppos-
ing segregation or refuting supremacist mythology, may have
carried more punch, in certain contexts, than the same state-
ment by an African-American, simply because it would have
been more surprising. It is true that acceptance of an openly
66. The Dale Court's citations to Hurley were similar to the way the Court
in Hurley had cited the earlier expressive association cases as informing, but
not determining its conclusion. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580.
67. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
68. Id. at 2455.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2458.
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gay or African-American scoutmaster creates dissonance with a
belief in inequality. It does not follow, however, that no signifi-
cant dissonance flows from allowing the same dissenting views
to be endorsed by other spokespersons, especially when they
function as role models.
The danger of the Court's easy assumption is that by ac-
cording the Boy Scouts the "right to choose to send one message
but not the other,'71 the Court invites other organizations to
quietly adopt resolutions of disapproval of homosexuality and
then use them, not to require adherence to a philosophy, but
simply to rid themselves of certain individuals, while leaving
others who disagree, perhaps in greater numbers, within the
group. This flatly contradicts the Court's holding in Runyon v.
McCrary,72 where it ruled that a private school had a right to
teach racist beliefs but not to exclude African-American stu-
dents.73 The Dale majority simply ignores Runyon.
One must worry whether there is potential for leakage into
other branches of First Amendment law, specifically cases
where defendants assert that a belief in the immorality of ho-
mosexuality shields them from the requirements of civil rights
laws that govern employment and housing. Similar defenses
have been raised by landlords who refused, on religious
grounds, to rent to unmarried heterosexual couples7 4 In those
cases, the objectionable sexual conduct was, at least, directly
linked to the commodity being offered by the defendant, since
one could assume that it would occur on site. - Dale raises the
possibility that landlords or employers could assert that a gay
man's or lesbian's mere presence violates their beliefs.
Lastly, the fourth principle that emerges from the decision
is a distressing willingness to abdicate the role of assessing the
bona fides of an organization's claim about the degree of harm
that would be inflicted by an individual's presence. If the Court
is willing to accept that as long as an organization is genuinely
expressive, it can rely on any claimed belief as a basis for ex-
clusion, it would appear to offer a carte blanche for groups to
71. Id. at 2455.
72. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
73. Id. at 176-77.
74. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, No. 00-499, 2001 WL 137665 (Feb. 20, 2001); Smith v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 913 (Cal. 1996); Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Ala. 1994); McCready
v. Hoffius, 593 N.W.2d 545, 545 (Mich. 1999).
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reinterpret, if not invent, beliefs in such amorphous concepts as
morality.
Writing for the Dale dissent, Justice Stevens focused pri-
marily on the weakness of the evidence that the BSA had a
clear policy regarding homosexuality, finding an expressive as-
sociation defense had to be based on more than the group's as-
sertion of the impact of an anti-discrimination law.75 Justice
Stevens argued that, given how little the BSA had chosen to
say about homosexuality, it could not meet the standard set in
the United States Jaycees-Rotary Club-New York State Club
Ass'n76 cases of demonstrating that retaining Dale would im-
pose a significant burden or substantial restraint on its expres-
sive activities, even if its position were to be characterized as
the desire to remain silent.77
Further, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for a con-
clusory assertion that Dale's mere presence would constitute
advocacy of any position.78 Justice Stevens noted that there
was no evidence that Dale had spoken about homosexuality in
his role as an assistant scoutmaster, nor was there any basis to
assume that he would in the future, other than a stereotyped
view of homosexuals as uncontrollable. 79 He found implausible
the concern that the Boy Scouts would be perceived as endors-
ing the views of one of its approximately one million adult
members. 80 In the most significant passage in the dissent, he
found that the majority's holding could only be based on a belief
that a gay man was uniquely "affixed with the label 'homosex-
ual.' That... even though unseen, communicates a message
that permits his exclusion wherever he goes.... Though unin-
tended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a con-
stitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority."81
75. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2459 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
76. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the club's
reasons for its exclusion policy were not substantive enough); Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (holding that the club had to admit women since it
would not significantly burden the interests they presented); N.Y. State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding a law forbidding dis-
crimination could be applied to the clubs because it did not significantly in-
fringe on their associational rights).
77. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Souter wrote a brief additional dissent, emphasiz-
ing that the nature of the Boy Scouts' belief, whether reflective
of bigotry or not, was not relevant to the standard that an ex-
pressive organization had to meet-that of a significant burden
on expression-in order to secure an exemption from the anti-
discrimination statute.8 2
II. AN EXPRESSIVE IDENTITY CRITIQUE OF DALE
The clash between an openly gay scoutmaster* and the Boy
Scouts presents a particularly rich illustration of what I have
called an expressive identity claim.8 3 An expressive identity
claim is one in which an equality claim incorporates a message
in which the assertion of self-worth is inseparable from the
equal treatment demand.8 4 Because lesbian and gay rights
cases center on an identity that is not visible, the separation of
expression and identity is easiest in those cases. It is my con-
tention, however, that virtually all equality cases consist of an
expressive identity claim, either implicitly or explicitly.
In most race cases, for example, the factor of visibility itself
functions to communicate both difference and, implicitly, self-
worth. The expressive content of visible racial difference is
powerfully demonstrated by the impulse to exclude. "I don't
want blacks in this group" reveals two political stances: explic-
itly that of the speaker and implicitly that of the African-
American person whose claim to a right of presence and inclu-
sion inherently rejects the attempted imposition of a badge of
inferiority. The impulse to exclude is always the signifier of a
viewpoint entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
In most lesbian and gay cases, coming out speech serves
the function of communicating both self-worth and self-
identification. The fact that the self-worth message material-
izes in speech, rather than in physical presence, should not lead
to a different constitutional standard for whether those who ob-
ject to that belief in equality should be exempt from anti-
discrimination laws. A belief in superiority in any form-
racial, sexual, or other-cannot be completely silenced by the
state.
82. Id. at 2479 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equal-
ity, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-17 (2000).
84. Id. at 17.
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The Boy Scouts' position is not entirely clear. Their first
briefs refer to the condemnation or immorality of homosexual
conduct.8 5 In their reply brief, they assert the desire to remain
silent about homosexuality, although apparently they do not
intend their silence to indicate neutrality.86 The Court's hold-
ing is phrased in terms of the BSA's right "to 'not promote ho-
mosexual conduct,"' quoting the reply brief.87 In whatever
form, the essence of their position is disapproval. Requiring
that they state it more clearly, if only internally, does not seem
an unfair prerequisite for a group seeking an expression-based
exemption from a generally applicable law.
In Dale, however, the Court was unable to escape a cul-
tural distortion chamber in its assessment of these competing
interests. As a result, it over-read the expressive component of
both Dale's identity as a gay man and the BSA's statements on
homosexuality. I shall discuss each of these points in turn, and
close this Part with some thoughts on the category of cases
where group beliefs and exclusion of persons overlap.
A. THE DEMONIZATION OF DALE
Compared to the unabashedly homophobic language of the
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,88 or of the dissent in Romer v.
Evans,8 9 the tone of the majority opinion in Dale is almost
bland. There is a careful evenhandedness whenever the text
trenches on the morality question itself. The Court rejects the
Boy Scouts' argument that the terms "morally straight" and
"clean" in the Boy Scout Oath and Law are on their face syn-
onymous with condemnation of homosexuality: "Some people
may believe that engaging in homosexual conduct is not at odds
with being 'morally straight' and 'clean.' And others may be-
lieve that engaging in homosexual conduct is contrary to being
'morally straight' and 'clean."' 90 The Court itself professes to
give no weight to meanings of morality: "We are not, as we
85. See Brief for Petitioners at 27, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228616.
86. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 432367.
87. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2453 (2000) (quoting Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 5, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No.
99-699)).
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
89. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
90. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
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must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts'
teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or
wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organiza-
tion's expression does not justify [its abridgement]."91
Without making a direct statement, however, the Court's
language invokes another canard: the intrinsic uncontrollabil-
ity of gay male sexuality. In the text of Dale, that specter has
been modernized. Sexuality has been merged into identity, but
not tamed. Dale's coming out replaces sexual acts per se as the
socially explosive moment. Once he had come out in any re-
spect, his identity as "homosexual," like his sexuality, became
impossible to control.
In the critical portion of the opinion in which the Court
found that Dale's mere presence would force the Boy Scouts to
send a message, the Court described him as "by his own admis-
sion,... one of a group of gay Scouts who have become leaders
in their community and are open and honest about their sexual
orientation."92 In the next sentence, the Court introduces a key
word: "Dale was the copresident of a gay and lesbian organiza-
tion at college and remains a gay rights activist."93 The Court
goes on to join these elements: "The presence of an avowed ho-
mosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's
uniform sends a distinc[t] ... message."94
As the dissent argues, these passages insinuate that Dale
would attempt to use an assistant scoutmaster position for
purposes of proclaiming the value of homosexuality. 95 In fact,
Dale stated that he would agree to be bound by the organiza-
tion's rules against that in his capacity as scoutmaster.96 The
initial newspaper article contained Dale's statements to a re-
porter covering a conference that he attended in which the Boy
Scouts were not mentioned.97 Nor, as the dissent notes, did
anyone contend that Dale was a person so publicly identified
with gay rights that he could be said to epitomize the issue,
91. Id. at 2458.
92. Id. at 2454 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 2455.
95. Id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See Brief for the Respondent at 33, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 340276.
97. See Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens,
STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), July 8, 1990, at 11.
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thus justifying his particular exclusion (rather than as a mem-
ber of the class).98
Instead, the Court impliedly finds that almost any openly
gay or lesbian person is radioactive. Nothing in the record
marks Dale as an "activist" other than his copresidency of a col-
lege student group,99 yet "activist" carries the unmistakable
whiff of extremism and zeal. It is difficult to imagine that the
copresident of a student Spanish club or drama club or Catholic
Youth Organization would be labeled, ten years later, an activ-
ist. Despite the rhetorical focus on his insinuated proclivity to
proselytize, it is also difficult to imagine that the Court would
have ruled differently if Dale had been a member rather than
copresident; or indeed, if he had never joined any organization
in his life except the Boy Scouts. Since there is no indication
that Dale sought out the reporter or initiated the interview, the
conclusion must be that nothing more than his willingness to
self-identify as gay justifies his exclusion. As the dissent con-
cludes, the result is that socially visible homosexuality creates
a basis for exclusion to an extent that no other minority charac-
teristic does. 100
Anthropologist Gayle S. Rubin would characterize this as
an example of "the fallacy of misplaced scale":
Throughout much of European and American history, a single act of
consensual anal penetration was grounds for execution .... Although
people can be intolerant, silly, or pushy about what constitutes proper
diet, differences in menu rarely provoke the kinds of rage, anxiety,
and sheer terror that routinely accompany differences in erotic taste.
Sexual acts are burdened with an excess of significance.10 1
98. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2473-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. The reference to "remain[ing]" an activist, id. at 2454, appears to refer
to statements Dale made when interviewed by the press concerning this litiga-
tion. The Court does not cite to any evidence of activism after college, but the
Boy Scouts' briefs refer to statements made by Dale to the press after filing
the complaint in his lawsuit. Brief for Petitioners at 9-10, Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228616; Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 9, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No.
99-699), available at 2000 WL 432367. In a true catch-22, bringing the law-
suit seems to have weakened his case. In any event, the only factors properly
to be considered are those upon which the Boy Scouts had based his expulsion
in 1990.
100. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2478 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267,
278-79 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
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The Court attaches an excess of significance to Dale's homo-
sexuality and then declares that as the self-evident import of
his presence.
B. HETERO-NORMATIVITY BY JUDICIAL NOTICE
One factor that makes Dale such an extraordinary case is
the intense signification value attached to both parties. For
Dale, the suffusion of sexuality rendered him a type of vam-
pire-seemingly normal, but dangerously destructive, driven by
forces of nature beyond his control. For the Boy Scouts, the
subtext is not primarily sex, but gender, and the relationship
between the two.
In their petition for certiorari, the Boy Scouts asserted that
their overarching purpose was to teach boys "what it means to
be a man."10 2 At some level, the entire case functioned as a
contest over the meanings of masculinity. It raised the ques-
tion of whether one should presume homosexuality to be within
the range of those meanings unless an organization proved that
it had adopted and wished to express a clear philosophy to the
contrary; or whether one should presume homosexuality to be
understood as outside the bounds of that concept. With weak
evidence as to the exact nature of the BSA's philosophy, the
Court had to be guided by a default mechanism. The majority
saw condemnation as the default position. Under that logic,
the slightest expression of disapproval could trigger the full
force of the presumption of condemnation. The absence of
widespread dissemination of the policy statements against ho-
mosexuality logically would be less important because, as a
practical matter, everyone understood or at least expected that
condemnation would be the Boy Scouts' position.
By contrast, the dissenters required specificity. They were
operating from the opposite default position: unless the BSA
demonstrated "a clear and unequivocal view" against homo-
sexuality, one could not grant them the benefit of the doubt. 03
The dissenters' position makes sense only if one believes that
there is nothing intrinsically contradictory between masculinity
and homosexuality. Under that logic, one would have to articu-
late a clear philosophy to the contrary to gain the benefit of an
102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699).
103. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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expressive association defense and an exemption from an oth-
erwise applicable statute.
If one compares Dale to Roberts v. United States Jaycees,104
one can see the opposite default position in operation. There,
the majority rejected the Jaycees' arguments that their exclu-
sionary policy, which was abundantly clear to every member,
was linked to the organization's public policy positions on a
number of issues, such as national security policy, on which
women tended to disagree. 10 5 The Court rejected that reason-
ing as mere stereotyping, seeing nothing intrinsically contra-
dictory between that organization with its policy stance and the
inclusion of women. 106
The majority's position in Dale accurately reflects the tra-
ditional and still widespread precept that condemnation of ho-
mosexuality is the (appropriate) norm, which is, like all norms,
marked by silence. If there is one significant cultural message
from Dale, it is the tenuousness of that traditional understand-
ing of masculinity as the dominant one culture-wide. There are
multiple markers of its fragility. First is simply the closeness
of the decision itself, the fact that four Justices used neutrality
as the default. Second, the litigation of the case and the public
reaction to the decision have forced the Boy Scouts to much
more loudly declare a policy that they had apparently wanted
to keep below the social radar screen unless necessary to eject
someone.10 7 The very need to articulate the policy undercuts its
claim to be the presumed cultural understanding.
Most importantly, the case illustrates that the rhetoric of
egalitarian masculinity that is the hallmark of the Boy Scouts
is no longer a satisfactory substitute for a fully inclusive con-
cept of citizenship. The Boy Scouts' image as a paragon of good
citizenship begins to fade when their strongest argument to the
Court is the right to believe in inequality. Dale tells us that the
assumption that conforming to gender norms is the price of
admission to a shared civic culture is under severe challenge.
104. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
105. Id. at 640.
106. Id. at 628.
107. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Victory Has Consequences of Its Own, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A28; Darragh Johnson, Scouts' Use of Schools Under
Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2000, at Al; Eric Lipton, Local Scouting Board,
Calling Gay Ban 'Stupid,' Urges End to National Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
2001, at B3; Kate Zernike, Scouts' Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss
in Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al.
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C. THE EXPRESSION-EXCLUSION CONTINUUM
The concept of expressive identity is an attempt to normal-
ize equality claims in which expression is somehow required in
order to make the identity characteristic socially visible. It is
an argument that they should be treated the same as other
equality claims, those based on immediately visible character-
istics, because ultimately all equality claims are expressive.
This, however, does not answer the question of when, if ever,
identity is acceptable as a basis for exclusion.
The tension in the expressive association cases involving
membership organizations arises from the prohibition of dis-
crimination based on certain identity characteristics combined
with the constitutional right to associate. In order to protect
the group's right, we allow them to exclude persons "whose
manifest views [alre at odds" with a group policy, 10 8 whose
presence would impede their ability to communicate their mes-
sage "nearly as effectively." 10 9
Under this principle, the Boy Scouts unquestionably has a
right to exclude persons with views contrary to its own. Grant-
ing them the deference shown by the majority and accepting as
bona fide that the Boy Scouts command to be "morally straight"
communicates disapproval of homosexuality, they have the
right to exclude all who would communicate approval. In Dale,
however, that dog did not bark: the Boy Scouts have not genu-
inely sought to exclude everyone communicating approval of
homosexuality.110
108. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 581 (1995).
109. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
110. The record is considerably less than clear on this aspect of the Boy
Scouts' policy. At oral argument, counsel for the Boy Scouts represented that
the organization would exclude any adults, including heterosexuals, who
communicated approval of homosexuality directly to troop members. See
Transcript, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) [here-
inafter Transcript], available at 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 44, at *11-*12, *19.
However, counsel also acknowledged that he had "no information" on whether
a heterosexual who had spoken approvingly of homosexuality in a public fo-
rum such as the press, which was the only instance of Dale's having so spoken,
would be excluded on that basis. Id. at *13. Nor, apparently, has any hetero-
sexual man ever been excluded on the ground of living with a woman prior to
marriage. Id. at *7-*8. The dissent focused on the fact that the Boy Scouts
permitted religious groups that did not condemn homosexuality to act as troop
sponsors (and presumably convey that view to troop members in a religious
context). Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2462-63 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The majority pointedly stated that any difference in how het-
erosexuals expressing approval of homosexuality were treated was "irrelevant"
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Dale is an example of a case that sits at the border between
expression and discriminatory exclusion. The Court has not
developed an adequate methodology for assessing when an or-
ganization has crossed that line. Although organizations can
lawfully exclude persons for a number of reasons, cases such as
Dale arise when an organization seeks an exemption from a
statute that protects persons with certain characteristics from
discrimination based on a legislative judgment that prejudice is
frequently directed against members of this group.
I suggest thinking of this situation as a continuum. Seek-
ing group unity based on shared beliefs/goals lies at one end of
a continuum. Excluding persons solely because their identity
renders them somehow undesirable is at the other end. In my
view, a group's right to exclude should generally extend from
that first starting point as far as reasonably necessary to
achieve the goal of shared beliefs.
In some situations, applying that principle will allow a
group to exclude for the fall length of the continuum. For some
groups, especially social clubs, celebration of the shared iden-
tity is itself the entire or primary purpose of the group. For
other groups, the core organizing purpose is a belief in some
form of superiority, such as the inevitable example of the Ku
Klux Klan. The Klan meets this test: only believers in white
supremacy may join. Given the overwhelming importance to
the Klan of its beliefs in supremacy and segregation, I would
argue that they should be permitted to extend their exclusions
to include the far point on the continuum, in other words, to ex-
clude all non-whites. The Klan is nothing if not consistent.
What a group drawn together by shared beliefs or goals
should not be permitted to do is to start at the other end of the
continuum, to use a protected characteristic as its only basis for
seeking unity. In other words, although I recognize that an
identity characteristic might function reasonably well as a
proxy for certain beliefs, it can only be a partial proxy. I would
require the organization to, in essence, have the courage of its
convictions and accept only members or leaders who shared
those beliefs, whatever they were. If a belief is important
enough to serve as a basis for excluding a group of people spe-
cifically protected by law, then it should be important enough
to define eligibility for membership. If it does define eligibility
to their holding. Id. at 2454. As Justice Ginsburg noted, the case was decided
on cross-motions for summary judgment; there was never a trial as to the facts
of how the Boy Scouts dealt with these situations. Transcript, supra, at *41.
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for everyone seeking to join, then the organization has a much
more genuine claim to reach the identity end of the continuum
in its exclusions.
I acknowledge that this approach would lead to some in-
trusion in internal organization affairs, a disadvantage that
must be acknowledged. That limited intrusions can be justified
by a compelling interest in securing full civil rights for histori-
cally disadvantaged groups is, however, well established by the
United States Jaycees-Rotary Club-New York State Club
Ass'n1" line of cases. This proposal for intrusion has the ad-
vantage that its effect will be to produce more, not less, expres-
sion of the organization's contrary beliefs.
The Dale Court rejected this approach, saying that the Boy
Scouts were entitled to choose to send one message but not the
other-to reject sending the message that Dale represented but
to accept sending the message conveyed by heterosexual
scoutmasters who believed there to be nothing wrong with ho-
mosexuality. This statement invites an organization engaged
primarily in expressive activity on any topic to simply adopt a
resolution barring gay members. It eliminates any basis upon
which a court could assess whether the exclusion is necessary
to the preservation of the group's shared beliefs. On this logic,
there is dangerously little left of the anti-discrimination protec-
tion.
A more fundamental objection to my suggestion is that
these doctrinal grids are simply inadequate to the task, that
the project of reworking or fine-tuning the law of expressive as-
sociation always raises more questions than it answers. The
complexities and contradictions associated with sexuality exac-
erbate the problem. The rejoinder, of course, is that law none-
theless generates answers, often in an iterative series, because
concrete claims must be adjudicated. Recognizing that, I closed
this Part by proposing a standard based on a belief/identity
continuum. In the remainder of this Essay, I will move away
from doctrine, first to situate Dale's claim historically and then
to reframe the questions as ones of social theory.
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW AND THE
MEANINGS OF CITIZENSHIP
Dale is a genuinely difficult case, raising difficult ques-
tions. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests strongly in his opinion
111. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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for the Court that the conflict is unnecessary, that the Boy
Scouts should never have been covered by the New Jersey stat-
ute in the first place, that public accommodations laws should
stick to their traditional focus on inns, common carriers, and
merchants. 112 Although that suggestion has a bright line ap-
peal, I will argue that he is misreading the history of public ac-
commodations laws and that a deeper reading of that history
reveals a continuous, evolving dialectic with understandings of
citizenship.
Today, principles of public accommodations also figure
prominently in debates about civil society.1 13 Although there is
no single definition of civil society, the term usually denotes
voluntary associations that are neither familial nor state-run.
The entities that comprise civil society encourage collective de-
liberation and action, while serving as a buffer between the in-
dividual and the state. Although public accommodations and
civil society are not synonymous, some overlap between these
concepts exists. Thus, in the broader discourse of whether law
should be enlisted in the effort to strengthen civil society, is-
sues of public accommodations and expressive association in-
evitably arise.
Given this degree of significance, it is especially unfortu-
nate that the law has never developed a theory of public ac-
commodations. As a 1968 article focused only on commercial
entities concluded, "There is no underlying rationale which dis-
tinguishes private businesses from public businesses. Legisla-
tures and courts have chosen to lump together whatever busi-
nesses they think ought to serve [a given group], without
developing any clear-cut theory to justify such inclusions or ex-
clusions." 114 As a result, there is great variance in the defini-
tions of what constitutes a public accommodation.
At the federal level, two statutes prohibit discrimination in
public accommodations: Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which protects against discrimination based on race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin;' 1 5 and Title III of the Americans with
112. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2455-56 (2000).
113. There is a voluminous literature on the concept of civil society. For an
excellent compilation of the legal ramifications of this discussion, see generally
Symposium, Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil
Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289 (2000).
114. Alfred Avins, What Is A Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ.
L. REV. 1, 68 (1968).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
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Disabilities Act of 1990.116 The former reaches only four cate-
gories of accommodations: lodgings, eating establishments, gas
stations, and places of exhibition or entertainment.117 The lat-
ter covers twelve categories, several of them quite broad, such
as retail stores, "service establishment[s]," places of "exercise or
recreation," and "social service center establishment[s]. "118
Neither of the federal statutes offers a generic definition of the
term public accommodation; the definition is coterminous with
the list of included entities.
All fifty states plus the District of Columbia have an anti-
discrimination statute that covers at least some public accom-
modations for some groups. 119 They each define public accom-
modations differently, although in distinct patterns. Some
limit the included entities to only those specified in the stat-
ute, 120 while most statutes include a list of entities but provide
that other similar ones will also be covered. 121
As to the scope of who is protected, state law prohibits
three major bases for discrimination that federal law does not.
The most common is sex discrimination, which is banned by
forty-three state statutes, including the District of Columbia. 122
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994).
119. See Lisa Gabriella Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination
in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommoda-
tions Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 290-91 (1978).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (LEXIS 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
107(a) (LEXIS Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West Supp.
2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a) (Michie 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2519(a) (LEXIS 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.092 (West 1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 489-3 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 67-5901(2) (Michie 1995); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/1-102 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-2 (Michie 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(C)(1) (2000);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.145 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247
(West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592 (West 1989); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2302 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2000);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.065(1) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304
(1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-134 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A17
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Mi-
chie Supp. 2000) (to be repealed July 1, 2006); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKin-
ney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-14 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.02(G) (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1402 (West 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1988); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West 1991); R.I.
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Of those forty-three laws, eleven also prohibit sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. 123 In addition, twenty-one state statutes,
including the District of Columbia, cover marital status dis-
crimination. 124 One federal law, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, prohibits discrimination based on sex and marital
status. 125
Thus, there is enormous variation in the fundamental con-
cept of what is a public accommodation and on what bases such
entities may exclude or differentiate as to certain groups of
persons. It is a mistake, however, to treat public accommoda-
tions law as simply an arbitrary collection of lists. To under-
stand how this body of law evolved, one must trace the history
of successive waves of civil rights movements.
GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-23 (Michie 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (1999); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716 (Michie 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.215 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-
9(6) (Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (West Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-9-101 (Michie 1999).
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982) (Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of
the Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998), interpreted separate pub-
lic accommodations law to bar sexual orientation discrimination); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519(a) (LEXIS 1999);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1993) (limiting the provision to entities receiving
state financial assistance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2000);
MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (LEXIS Supp.
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 11-24-2 (2000);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (West Supp.
2000).
124. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (LEXIS 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
601(2) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a) (Michie 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519(a) (LEXIS
1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.07 (West 1997); HAw. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1993)
(limiting the provision to entities receiving state financial assistance); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/1-102 (2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-14 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1999); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-14-602(b)
(1996) (limiting the provision to innkeepers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716 (Michie 1995).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (West 2000). The Act states, "It shall be unlawful
for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any as-
pect of a credit transaction--(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to
contract)." Id.
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B. RACE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS/SoCIAL RIGHTS DISTINCTION
Although racial discrimination is considered the most set-
tled of all the civil rights claims as to public accommodations
both in legal doctrine and in social consensus, the deeply prob-
lematic questions that we face today echo from the race cases.
The accepted starting point in examining public accommo-
dations law is the principle that under common law, business
owners have a property right to refuse service unless they are
innkeepers, common carriers, or public utilities.12 6 In the sin-
gle most comprehensive study of public accommodations law,
however, Joseph Singer argues that under eighteenth and early
nineteenth century principles of implied contract, owners of
any commercial property that was held open to the public had a
duty to serve all patrons.12 7 According to Singer, race was the
factor that led to a narrowing of that pre-classical concept such
that the common law duty to serve was enforced only as to inn-
keepers and common carriers. 128 Regardless of whether one ac-
cepts Singer's argument about pre-classical law, race unques-
tionably dominated legal discourse from the mid-nineteenth to
mid-twentieth century concerning the two most important
questions related to public accommodations law: which physical
spaces such law governed and whether there was a legal differ-
ence between exclusion and segregation.
The era in which public accommodations law began and
became common, the second half of the nineteenth century, was
dominated by an ideology of race according to which law was
believed competent to adjudicate civil or political rights, but
could not prescribe social rights or social equality. 2 9 The fram-
126. Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.E. 736, 737 (N.Y. 1911); Bowlin v. Lyon, 25 N.W.
766, 767-68 (Iowa 1885); see also Avins, supra note 114, at 7; Earl M. Maltz,
"Separate but Equal" and the Law of Common Carriers in the Era of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 553, 554 (1986); Max W. Turner & Frank
R. Kennedy, Exclusion, Ejection, and Segregation of Theater Patrons, 32 IOWA
L. REV. 625, 626 (1947).
127. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations
and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303-31, 1345-48 (1996).
128. Id. at 1372-73, 1390-1412.
129. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 292-95 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION
231 (1988); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 147-49 (1950); Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1119-20 (1997); Mark
Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection
Clause, Dr. DuBois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 884, 886-
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ers of the Reconstruction Amendments shared that ideology, 130
and it saturated and shaped judicial interpretations of public
accommodations statutes. Like school segregation, limitations
on the scope of public accommodations laws were necessary to
its hegemony.
The question of whether a particular space was deemed a
public accommodation, for example, determined the venues in
which integration would occur. In Massachusetts, for example,
the state's highest court ruled, in an 1858 case, that places of
entertainment, such as theaters open to the public, were not in
the same category, and thus not under the same legal obliga-
tion to serve the public, as inns and common carriers. 131 The
limitation was codified in the state's-and the nation's-first
public accommodations statute, enacted in 1865.132 The specifi-
cation of which physical spaces were affected became increas-
ingly prominent as part of the codification process. Without
losing its patina of neutrality, the enumeration component of
public accommodations laws sub silentio regulated racial mix-
ing.
From 1875 to 1883, federal law mandated fuller equality in
a somewhat broader set of spaces. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
provided criminal and civil penalties for denying any citizen
"the full and equal enjoyment" of "inns, public conveyances...
theaters, and other places of public amusement" based on
race. 133 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court ruled
that the statute was invalid because Congress lacked the con-
stitutional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to
reach beyond state action to privately-owned entities, and it
90 (1987).
130. MILTON R. KONVITZ & THEODORE LEsKEs, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTs 94-98 (1961).
131. McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 211, 212-13 (1858); accord
Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 68 A. 721, 722 (R.I. 1908); Taylor v.
Cohn, 84 P. 388, 389 (Or. 1906); Greenberg v. W. Turf Ass'n, 82 P. 684, 685
(Cal. 1905); Homey v. Nixon, 61 A. 1088, 1089 (Pa. 1905); Aaron, 96 N.E. at
737; Bowlin, 25 N.W. at 767-68.
132. 1865 Mass. Acts 277. In 1866, Massachusetts adopted a separate
statute that in effect repealed the limitation by forbidding racial discrimina-
tion in "any... public place of amusement." 1866 Mass. Acts 252. The two
statutes were later replaced by a more comprehensive legislative scheme pro-
scribing discrimination in public places. 1885 Mass. Acts 316. For a succinct
summary of the Massachusetts code provisions, see Bryant v. Rich's Grill, 103
N.E. 925, 926-27 (Mass. 1914), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1995).
133. Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
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lacked authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations because those acts did
not amount to a "badge" or "incident" of slavery. 134
In its Thirteenth Amendment analysis, the Court in the
Civil Rights Cases staked out the boundaries of the political
and the social realms. The Court ruled that "the necessary in-
cidents of slavery" burdened those "fundamental rights which
are the essence of civil freedom": property rights and rights of
access to the legal process. 135 The Court distinguished these
from "the social rights of men and races in the community." 36
The Court ruled that denial of access to a given space by a pri-
vate party did not amount to imposing a badge or incident of
slavery but merely amounted to "an ordinary civil injury."137
Indeed, on the Court's analysis, no private party could impose a
badge or incident of slavery.
Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases,
articulated a much fuller meaning of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, arguing that it gave Congress authority to prohibit dis-
crimination that reflected the ideology of racial superiority
upon which slavery was based. 138 In his view, "Exemption from
race discrimination in respect of the civil rights which are fun-
damental in citizenship in a republican government, is ... a
new [constitutional] right."139 He too, however, drew a line be-
tween civil and social rights, although in a different place. "I
agree that government has nothing to do with social... rights
of individuals.... [N]o legal right of a citizen is violated by the
refusal of others to maintain merely social relations with
hiM."14 0
The Court further embellished the political/social rights
distinction in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which it upheld a Louisiana
statute mandating segregation in railway cars.141 The Court
categorized such segregation as "social," analogizing to school
134. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-26 (1883). Freed from federal
law, southern states enacted Jim Crow laws, affirmatively requiring segrega-
tion, a downward spiral that reached its doctrinal nadir when the Court up-
held a mandatory segregation statute in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552
(1896).
135. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id. at 39-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
141. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
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segregation and anti-miscegenation laws, which were then un-
challenged. 142 Justice Harlan again dissented, reading the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments together as guaran-
teeing "personal liberty,"143 including "exemptions from legal
discriminations-implying inferiority in civil society."1' Jus-
tice Harlan's "sense of liberty is not simply the freedom to do as
one will; it is rather the freedom to participate equally in de-
mocratic self-governance."145
Under both Justice Harlan's and the majority's ap-
proaches, civil and social rights existed in separate zones. The
Court's majority saw the realm of civil rights as extremely
small and the social rights zone as insulating virtually all so-
cial norms from regulation. Justice Harlan conceptualized the
civil rights zone as synonymous with citizenship to which he
gave a more generous interpretation, and the social zone as a
smaller sphere of interpersonal relations. Justice Harlan's
support for African-Americans having right of access to a lim-
ited number of privately-owned spaces did not, for him, intrude
on either privacy or the freedom to believe, as he did, in the
inequality of the races. 146
In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Cases, eighteen states
enacted their own public accommodations statutes, most copied
verbatim from the text of the 1875 Act. 147 Thus, this core set of
state public accommodations statutes literally grew out of de-
bates over the scope of an individual's civil rights as a citizen.
There is a very particular and direct relationship between pro-
hibitions on discrimination in public accommodations and the
meaning of citizenship.
Although the language of civil versus social rights has dis-
appeared, the central constitutional rulings in the Civil Rights
Cases are still good law. In the specific context of public ac-
commodations, the Court's reasoning still controls federal law.
The scope of Thirteenth Amendment protection has been ex-
tended beyond conditions of literal servitude to include the
power to make contracts, but the Court has refused to extend it
142. Id. at 544.
143. See id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961,
976.
146. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
147. Turner & Kennedy, supra note 126, at 631 n.22.
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much further. 148 The limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to state action remains law.1
49
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had hinted that Con-
gress might have the requisite power under the Commerce
Clause to require non-discriminatory access to private prop-
erty.150 In 1964, as part of the omnibus civil rights bill, Con-
gress took the hint, specifically grounding Title II in its power
over interstate commerce. 151 The question of whether to base
the Act on the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment generated tremendous debate among supporters of the
legislation. 152 One Fourteenth Amendment theory was that
Congressional authorization to regulate state action could sup-
port a provision that reached all public accommodations that
states licensed. 153 The NAACP and Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA) argued that the Court had dropped hints in re-
cent cases that it was ready to reconsider its holding in the
Civil Rights Cases that Congress could not reach private actors
under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment.
154
148. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989).
149. See generally Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The exact boundaries of this limita-
tion, however, remain in dispute. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
150. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18-19 (1883).
151. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243.
152. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 90-93, 127-33 (1990); DONALD
G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY
295, 297-98, 306-09 (1966); DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY: CLA-
RENCE MITCHELL, JR.'S STRUGGLE FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
563-70 (1990).
153. See GRAHAM, supra note 152, at 128.
154. See WATSON, supra note 152, at 567. ADA counsel Joseph Rauh relied
primarily on Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (holding state court
enforcement of restrictive covenants to deny access to property based on race
violates equal protection), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding lessees of state property must comply with the
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment). See id. These legislative argu-
ments were formulated in the summer of 1963. In June 1964, the Supreme
Court announced its holding in Bell v. Maryland, deciding whether enforce-
ment of a trespass law against lunch counter sit-in demonstrators violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). The Court reversed the convic-
tion on the ground that Maryland's subsequent adoption of a state public ac-
commodations law had abolished the crime of which Bell, the petitioner, had
been convicted. Id. at 238-42. By so ruling, the Court sidestepped the oppor-
tunity to address whether state action to enforce a property owner's exclusion
based on race violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren, to-
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The Justice Department advocated strongly for restricting
the entities covered to those with direct relation to the move-
ment of people and goods across state lines.155 In addition to
the danger of a second Supreme Court invalidation, the De-
partment, reinforced with a memorandum from Professor Paul
A. Freund, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment theory left
control to the states, which could deregulate certain entities,
and resulted in many more entities covered, although not nec-
essarily the same ones in each state. 15 6 In the end, Congress
mentioned both constitutional grounds in the Act's preface, 157
but structured the Act solely as a regulation of interstate com-
merce.
The final definition was limited even more narrowly than
the Commerce Clause authority could have encompassed, pri-
marily reaching hotels, restaurants, and theaters. 58 The defi-
nition, however, also included places of business that contained
eating establishments, 159 and because of that, it reached hun-
dreds of department and variety stores that contained restau-
rants or lunch counters. In addition, federal courts consistently
interpreted the list of public accommodations broadly, rejecting,
for example, a campaign to distinguish "places of entertain-
ment and exhibition" from those of "enjoyment" in an effort to
exclude participatory activities and cover only spectatorship.' 60
gether with Justices Douglas and Goldberg, concurred in the judgment but
would have reached the merits and held that the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
tended "the traditional rights of access to places of public accommodation...
to Negroes." Id. at 316 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In a separate concurrence,
Justice Douglas argued that "the right to be served in places of public accom-
modations is an incident of national citizenship." Id. at 250 (Douglas, J., con-
curring). Justices Black, Harlan, and White dissented, arguing instead that it
was permissible for the state to enforce the wishes of a private property owner
to exclude persons based on race. Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). The Bell
decision came too late to influence the text of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
155. GRAHAM, supra note 152, at 91-92, 127-28; MORGAN, supra note 152,
at 300-02, 308-09; WATSON, supra note 152, at 565-66.
156. See GRAHAM, supra note 152, at 92-93. More prosaically, but perhaps
of equal importance, basing the bill on the Commerce Clause ensured that it
would be sent to a Senate committee chaired by a bill supporter rather than to
the Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator James Eastland of Mississippi.
See id. at 81, 90.
157. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(b), 78 Stat. 241,
243.
158. Id. §§ 201(b)(1)-(4).
159. Id. § 201(b)(2).
160. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438-39
(1973); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969); United States v. Slidell
Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 482-83 (E.D. La. 1974); Miller v.
1622 [Vol. 85:1591
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Title II probably realized its fullest potential as an anti-
discrimination mechanism, given its confining list of covered
establishments, because of such judicial interpretations. The
ensuing dismantlement of apartheid in the everyday consumer
life of the South was the most immediate and visible result of
the entire 1964 Civil Rights Act.161
Nonetheless, in important ways, the 1964 Act did not
break with the past. It continued the model of enumerating
specific public accommodations rather than attempting a more
generic definition. Within those categories, Congress asserted
its plenary power to reach those "discriminatory practices
which inhibit travel." 62 But with no Fourteenth or Thirteenth
Amendment grounding to the statute, there was no underlying
logic to it other than providing access on a non-discriminatory
basis to institutions serving, or instrumentalities moving in, in-
terstate commerce.1 63
Although the Commerce Clause authority reached non-
profit entities, its surest application was to business exchanges
and consumer purchases. 1 4 Even the Senate bill, which had a
broader scope than the final enactment, only applied to a "pub-
lic place that keeps goods for sale to the public... and any
other establishment where goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations are held out to the public for
Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc); Lerman
& Sanderson, supra note 119, at 222; see also generally Donald T. Kramer,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 201 (3) and Related
Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000a(b)(3)), Prohibiting
Discrimination or Segregation in Motion-Picture Houses, Theaters, Concert
Halls, Sports Arenas, Stadiums, or Other Places of Exhibition or Entertain-
ment, 7 A.L.R. FED. 415 (1971 & Supp. 2000).
161. I do not mean to imply, however, that completely equal access has
been achieved anywhere in the United States, even as to everyday retail sales.
See generally Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's
Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147 (discuss-
ing African-Americans' attitudes toward commerce in modern America).
162. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251
(1964).
163. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., Court, in a nod to those who de-
fended the Act on other grounds, acknowledged that Congress was also legis-
lating on a moral basis and declared that this component of legislative purpose
did not invalidate the Act. Id. at 257.
164. Non-profits that were engaged in selling products or running recrea-
tional facilities were generally covered. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, §§ 201(b)(1)-(4), 78 Stat. 241, 243. Membership clubs, which were
exempt from coverage, id. § 201(e), became a frequent sticking point, see infra
text accompanying notes 168-179.
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sale, use, rent, or hire."1 65 The judicial interpretation of Title II
also reflected that focus. 166 The end result was a doctrinal
hangover from the civil versus social rights ideology that Con-
gress could not cure because of the Civil Rights Cases and that
the Supreme Court has never repudiated.
C. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE
EXPANSIVE MARKET CONCEPT
Because sex discrimination was not included as part of the
federal public accommodations law, women's rights advocates
turned to state legislatures for a remedy. By the late 1970s,
twenty-six of the existing thirty-nine state public accommoda-
tions statutes had been amended to add sex as a prohibited ba-
sis for discrimination. 67
The result was a subtle but powerful shift in the import of
public accommodations law. The shift was subtle because,
other than adding sex to the list of prohibited bases for exclu-
sion or discrimination, the 1970s changes to state laws did not
alter statutory language. It was powerful, however, because
the addition of sex discrimination reframed the social impact of
these laws.
Women as a group were not excluded from, or segregated
in, their participation in American life as consumers the way
that African-Americans had been. Indeed, if anything, they
were celebrated for consumption. In cases brought by women,
the targets shifted from nominally public businesses with ra-
cialized practices to nominally private entities that functioned
as sites for the informal exchange of social and economic capi-
tal. The laws were applied to clubs, such as the Jaycees or Ro-
tary Club, that were formally membership organizations but
which functioned as adjunct business places, where the kind of
networking that is essential to success often occurred.
This expansion of the equality mandate was enabled by the
fact that the sex discrimination challenges brought under state
law were not required to adhere to an interstate commerce ra-
tionale for their viability as causes of action. In fact, any con-
cern was quite the opposite. When a state law materially af-
fects the flow of interstate commerce, it will run afoul of the
165. S. REP. No. 88-872, at 3 (1964). In addition, all such establishments
had to be shown to have an impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 3-4.
166. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 252-57.
167. Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 119, at 264.
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Dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, the increased use of state
public accommodations laws that occurred in sex discrimina-
tion cases had the effect of localizing the inquiry. It focused ju-
dicial attention on the interstitial connections between eco-
nomic and social institutions.
As a result of the sex discrimination cases brought against
membership clubs, courts held that the scope of public accom-
modations was not limited to venues for the sale of tangible
goods and services, but that intangibles, such as leadership
skills, could be classified as "goods."168 Courts also stressed
that there was an economic link, albeit somewhat indirect, be-
tween these non-profit clubs and the market, and that persons
excluded from such clubs suffered tangible, material harm.169
In general, the business and civic clubs' activities were concep-
tualized as falling under the rubric of "public, quasi-commercial
conduct."170 The Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees framed the market as a proxy for democratic institu-
tions: "This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the
changing nature of the American economy and of the impor-
tance.., of removing the barriers to economic advancement
and political and social integration that have historically
plagued certain disadvantaged groups." 171
Justice O'Connor is the Court's leading proponent of basing
application of such a civil rights provision squarely on whether
the group is primarily commercial. Her concurring opinion in
United States Jaycees rejected the Court's balancing of an en-
tity's expressive function against a state's least restrictive im-
plementation of a compelling interest. 172 Instead, Justice
O'Connor would draw a much brighter line, that between or-
ganizations predominantly engaged in protected expression and
those predominantly engaged in market related activity. 173
Positing the state's proper goal as that of "ensuring nondis-
criminatory access to the commercial opportunity presented by
membership," 74 Justice O'Connor argued that "[o]nce [a group]
168. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
169. Id. at 625-26.
170. Id. at 625.
171. Id. at 626.
172. Id. at 632-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 635-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 640 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1625
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 2000-2001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree,"
it loses its constitutional defense.17 5
That, in her view, is what happened to the Jaycees. Jus-
tice O'Connor agreed that "advocacy of political and public
causes, selected by the membership, is a not insubstantial part
of what [the club] does."176 Even accepting that as a legitimate
claim to an expressive function, however, the Jaycees were an
"easy case" for application of the statute because commercially-
linked entities, no matter how expressive, fell outside an asso-
ciation defense. "Notwithstanding its protected expressive ac-
tivities, the Jaycees ... is, first and foremost, an organization
that, at both the national and local levels, promotes and prac-
tices the art of solicitation and management."177
Justice O'Connor reiterated her views four years later,
joined this time by Justice Kennedy, who had not been a mem-
ber of the Court at the time of United States Jaycees. In New
York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, the Court upheld a
New York City public accommodations statute against a facial
challenge filed by a consortium of private clubs, holding that it
was constitutional as applied to a significant number of the
member clubs and thus could not be stricken as overbroad. 178
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize
that a large membership would not per se disqualify a private
club from having an expressive association defense, adding,
however, that "[piredominately commercial organizations are
not entitled to claim" such a defense 179
D. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ACCESS TO DiscuRsivE SPACE
The most recent wave of public accommodations claims has
arisen under state and local statutes prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Here, too, there has been no
statutory language change other than the addition of a new
prohibited basis for discrimination to a pre-existing list, but the
impact of this two-word addition has been substantial. As il-
lustrated by two major gay rights litigation efforts-the Boy
Scouts cases and cases seeking admission for openly lesbian
and gay contingents in ethnic pride parades, most famously the
175. Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 639 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 639 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988).
179. Id. at 20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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St. Patrick's Day parades' 80-the claim has been of a right to
presence, even when there is no material benefit at issue and a
fixed space is either non-existent or irrelevant. These claims
are not about access to either physical space or to an opportu-
nity for material gain, but access to cultural or discursive
space.' 8 '
This current round of cases calls the question of the extent
to which the rationale of regulating the market and its penum-
bras is a necessary part of the foundation for public accommo-
dations laws. It marks a moment when the law has moved
from its initial concern with innkeepers and common carriers
to, potentially, a willingness to carry the equality principle into
civic organizations not linked in any obvious way to market
forces or economic harm. It signals a new kind of rights claim,
not to any form of property, however broadly conceived. It is a
claim to cultural citizenship.
Notably, each of the sexual orientation cases that has
reached the Supreme Court in the last five years has impli-
cated public accommodations laws in some way. In Romer v.
Evans, the Court struck down a state constitutional amend-
ment that would have repealed civil rights protections for les-
bians and gay men and erected a uniquely high barrier to their
re-enactment. 182 Among the laws affected were public accom-
modations provisions, which the Court described not as "spe-
cial" rights, but as "protections against exclusion from an al-
most limitless number of transactions and endeavors that
constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."183 In Romer,
however, no specific application of a public accommodations
statute was before the Court.
180. In addition to the Boston litigation, which ended with Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), there were
years of litigation concerning the New York City St. Patrick's Day Parade.
E.g., Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 918 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Bratton, 882 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Oliv-
ieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986). In addition, other groups of lesbians
and gay men have sought recognition in the celebrations of minority communi-
ties to which they belong. E.g., KEITH BOYKIN, ONE MORE RIVER TO CROSS:
BLACK AND GAY IN AMERICA 176-78 (1996) (describing an African-American
community parade in Chicago).
181. I take the phrase "discursive space" from Madhavi Sunder, Authorship
and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free
Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 49
STAN. L. REV. 143, 144 (1996).
182. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
183. Id. at 631.
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In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group, the Court refused to permit enforcement of the Massa-
chusetts state public accommodations statute to require the St.
Patrick's Day parade to allow a gay contingent to march.184
The Court in Hurley described the Jaycees in United States
Jaycees as an "association provid[ing] public benefits to which a
State could ensure equal access,"1 85 and "[a]ssum[ed] the [St.
Patrick's] parade to be... a source of benefits (apart from its
expression) that would generally justify a mandated access
provision."186 The Court did not discuss market links or the ab-
sence thereof explicitly, but the language suggests a desire to
frame the protection as centered on some form of benefits.
That discomfort became explicit in Dale. A full paragraph
in the Dale opinion is devoted to the Court's bemoaning the in-
creasing reach of public accommodations statutes, far beyond
inns and common carriers, to "places that often may not carry
with them open invitations to the public" and "without even at-
tempting to tie the term 'place' to a physical location."1 8 7 The
paragraph closes with a sentence that appears to reflect the
views expressed in United States Jaycees by Justice
O'Connor1 88 (who joined the opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist): "As the definition of 'public accommodation' has
expanded from clearly commercial entities.., to membership
organizations..., the potential for conflict between state pub-
lic accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights of
organizations has increased."189 It is evident that a majority of
the Court would prefer limiting the scope of public accommoda-
tions laws to "clearly commercial entities."
At issue beneath the surface of the debates over interpret-
ing the scope of public accommodations statutes is the proper
meaning of "public" in the context of civil rights law. The cur-
rently dominant view would be that the term "public," as ap-
plied to the private sector, connotes an expansive market, in-
cluding services as well as goods, and intangible as well as
tangible benefits. Commerce itself is a marker of what is pub-
lic; the absence of commerce can mark an entity as private. 190
184. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
185. Id. at 580.
186. Id.
187. 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2455-56 (2000).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
189. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456.
190. This bright line might, however, not be as bright as it first appears.
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The expansive market model, however, sells short the historical
tradition embodied in public accommodations statutes: the suc-
cessive waves of campaigns by subordinated groups to claim ac-
cess to fuller participation in a democracy.
IV. A THEORY OF, AND FOR, PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
The newer civil rights claims have shifted the meaning of
public accommodations law from what began as a property-
based concept linked to certain "places" and the limits on own-
ership rights associated with those places, to a much more ab-
stracted set of claims for recognition and cultural participation.
This shift has occurred simultaneously with new directions in
constitutional theory. Legal and political theorists such as
Jurgen Habermas have wrestled with the ramifications for de-
mocratic governance of what Habermas labeled the "public
sphere," a zone distinct from the state, the market, and the
family that included the voluntary associations of civil soci-
ety.191
Under its current interpretation, California's public accommodations law will
reach a boys club, a country club, and a non-profit homeowners association,
but not the Boy Scouts. In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts
of America, the California Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not cover
the Boy Scouts because the Boy Scouts were primarily social and expressive
with only a few auxiliary commercial or business functions. 952 P.2d 218, 238
(Cal. 1998). Treating the Boy Scouts, which proclaims itself "open to every
boy," as not a public accommodation was limited to its membership decisions
and policies; the court acknowledged that other organizational activities such
as a retail store might produce a different result. Id. In Warfield v. Peninsula
Golf & Country Club, the court found that a private country club with highly
selective membership criteria was a public accommodation based on the fact
that non-members could use club facilities on a daily fee basis, a source of club
income that benefited members. 896 P.2d 776, 792-93 (Cal. 1995). Girls won
the right to join a Boys Club on the ground that it was open to any boy for a
nominal fee and operated a large recreational facility in Isbister v. Boys' Club
of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212, 217-18 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). These deci-
sions are difficult to reconcile: "To put it bluntly," one justice wrote, "the law is
a mess." Curran, 952 P.2d at 260 (Brown, J., concurring).
The decisions illustrate the complications that can arise from the inter-
penetration of market and non-market functions within a single non-profit en-
tity. Warfield would suggest that if any function were classifiable as a public
accommodation, then the entire entity would be covered, including the mem-
bership policies. The Curran court, on the other hand, treated the two func-
tions as independent, implying that the organization would be classifiable as a
public accommodation for some of its activities, but not for others.
191. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUB-
UC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 2, 23, 30
(Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (1962); Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections
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For Habermas, the public sphere is primarily a discursive
zone: "the social space generated in communicative action....
This space stands open, in principle, for potential dialogue
partners who are present as bystanders or could come on the
scene and join those present."192 The concept of public sphere is
part of a complex theory of democratic legitimacy, which itself
is open to attack on the basis of a failure to address issues such
as the gendered nature of realms that Habermas describes in
universalistic terms. 193 Despite those shortcomings, and al-
though not the same as the zone defined by civil rights statutes
as public accommodations, the concepts of the public sphere
and civil society can help us reconceptualize what should be the
law's relationship to the buffer zone between the state and the
individual.
A. THE PUBLIC SPHERE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
The first duties imposed by public accommodations stat-
utes in the nineteenth century were to accept travelers seeking
transportation and lodging. Congress continued to place pri-
mary reliance on the same reasoning when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. But with the acceptance of an expansive
market interpretation of those statutes which are more gener-
ous in scope, the emphasis is no longer on the activity of travel
or on any discrete activities, but on an entire domain of life.
How broad that domain should be-whether it should consist of
only the market or of a large number of non-market-linked en-
tities as well-depends on what we intend these laws to
achieve.
As applied to the market, civil rights laws establish a level
playing field and eliminate irrationalities deriving from preju-
dice. They secure access to markets in commodities and capi-
tal, enabling both consumption and production. But they have
much deeper political functions as well because they also pro-
on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 453 (Craig
Calhoun ed., 1992).
192. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 360-61 (William Rehg trans.,
1996).
193. See generally Nancy Fraser, What's Critical about Critical Theory?, in
FEMINISTS READ HABERMAS: GENDERING THE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE 1, 1-55
(Johanna Meehan ed., 1995).
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vide access to discursive systems that generate a host of regula-
tory norms, many extending far beyond the market.
Although economic harm is undeniably important, indeed
sufficient, to justify a law mandating access to market-linked
venues, that sufficiency has hidden the importance of other
functions. Functions associated with cultural and social citi-
zenship are not mere epiphenomena of commercial entities.
They occur across a range of market and non-market sites, ex-
clusion from which constitutes much more than either economic
or emotional harm.
Take the example of theaters and places of amusement, a
category that was included in the 1964 Civil Rights Act despite
the fact that it is the category least connected to the consumer's
right to travel, which underlay the remainder of the legislation
(although it posed no constitutional problems to regulation un-
der that theory because entertainment moved in interstate
commerce). What Congress had most prominently in mind,
movie theaters, are certainly commercial enterprises, 194 but the
category clearly covered non-profit enterprises as well. Yet the
critical role of local theaters in the South did not turn on their
being one of life's most important or necessary services or on
the fact that films and production companies moved across
state lines. What made theaters important was their role as a
generator of public culture. Implicit in the demand to consti-
tute an audience was a recognition that performance is rela-
tional, not merely passive. Moviegoers constituted both a mar-
ket and a specific cultural public. Theaters are a stellar
example of how much more than money and goods is exchanged
in the market. Spaces and relations that are nominally com-
mercial or material have powerful normalizing functions as
well.
Such important aspects of a democratic system are cap-
tured only awkwardly by a public accommodations law. One
result is that courts have stretched to interpret "entertain-
ment" and "amusement" to reach activities that do not fall so
obviously in those categories. The claim by gay and lesbian
marchers to participate in the St. Patrick's Day parade, for ex-
ample, was grounded on the fact that the Massachusetts stat-
ute covered places of amusement. 195 No matter how one char-
194. Indeed, the Court once held that movies lacked First Amendment pro-
tection as expression because they were nothing more than business enter-
prises. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915).
195. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
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acterizes what was at stake in that case, it is certainly a great
deal more significant than amusement. The discursive systems
that arise around these venues, as well as around market-
based entities, trigger concerns for democratic self-governance.
They form the core of civil society.
In many instances, such voluntary organizations instanti-
ate norms of citizenship. Some, such as political parties, over-
lap directly with the state and form multiple direct connections
with the legislative and administrative branches. Others in-
teract with the state in less direct ways or less frequently-the
Boy and Girl Scouts would be examples of that form. Still oth-
ers, such as private schools, have no direct connection to state
authority, but may nonetheless openly profess or seek to incul-
cate normative behaviors that trench on qualities of citizen-
ship. In each instance, there is a broad invitation for members
of the public to participate. Discursive communities arise that
directly implicate civic identity. What is at stake in cases
based on public accommodations laws is access to that discur-
sive space-"the power to create and contest social meaning."196
Public accommodations statutes reach a public sphere or a
component of civil society in which widely-shared social norms
and meanings related to citizenship emerge. Habermas de-
scribed the public sphere as a "realm of our social life in which
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is
guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes
into being in every conversation in which private individuals
assemble to form a public body." 197 These are spaces that may
be mundane but nonetheless function as sites for political dis-
course. They are "multiple... and decentered publics where
people formulate their democratic aspirations."198 Habermas's
work does not address the deep normative conflicts raised by
cases such as Dale,199 but his fundamental insight linking the
operations of civil society's discursive infrastructure to the in-
557, 561-62 (1995).
196. Sunder, supra note 181, at 145.
197. Jurgen Habermas, The Public Sphere, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 105, 105 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds.,
1997).
198. MARY P. RYAN, CIVIC WARS: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE
AMERICAN CITY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 8 (1997).
199. I agree that his work could use a "more pragmatic temper regarding
plurality and difference." William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A
History, Guide, and Critique, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 969, 1012 (1998).
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tegrity of democratic political processes is nonetheless ex-
tremely useful.
Rather than persist in thinking of the issue as social rights
or social equality in the channels originally carved out in an at-
tempt to resist full racial equality, we should begin with the
question of which institutions and relations function most sig-
nificantly as generators of the norms and meanings of citizen-
ship. We need a theory of social citizenship, a recognition that
multiple social locations and spheres form parts of Americans'
lived experience of citizenship. One can imagine a Venn dia-
gram of three adjacent circles representing the state, the mar-
ket, and private sector non-commercial entities that are
broadly open to the public. A fourth circle superimposed on
top, that comprises segments of each of the other three, repre-
sents social citizenship.
Jane Schacter argues that civil society occupies a horizon-
tal plane that intersects with vertically aligned political insti-
tutions.2°° In the context of commenting on Romer v. Evans,
Schacter reviews the scholarship on two questions: whether so-
cial equality is endogenous or exogenous to democracy and
whether the equal protection clause is properly viewed as sub-
stantive or procedural.2 1 Schacter concludes that the dynam-
ics of political and social equality are better expressed in two
intersecting planes.202 She proposes that social status be imag-
ined as a horizontal plane encompassing multiple institutions,
which intersects with the vertical plane of political society at
the level of individual citizens and voters.20 3 The full vertical
plane in her analysis includes legislative, executive, and judi-
cial levels as well.204 On this conception, social status inevita-
bly, but indirectly, affects core political life.
Like Schacter, I believe that our concept of politics and
citizenship should attempt to capture the ramifications of the
regulatory quality of social norms and cultural meanings. I dif-
fer in that I argue that we should shift the focus from rights to
the forces that shape "citizens," and that we should recognize
that those forces are far broader than the traditional juridical
functions and institutions of the state on which most of the citi-
200. Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 361, 399-403 (1997).
201. Id. at 389-98.
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zenship scholarship has focused. "Citizen," in other words, is
not purely a creature of the state, either in birth or definition.
Implicitly, the law has recognized that markets have a role
in constituting citizenship. Indeed, public accommodations
laws constitute one example of that acknowledgment. Markets
seek consumers and thereby bring previously excluded indi-
viduals into central social dynamics. That development, how-
ever, also commodifies the concept of citizenship. One can ap-
preciate the value of market mechanisms while still believing
that citizenship should mean more than access to networking
and a fair chance to become a rainmaker. 20 5
The concept of social and cultural citizenship can be only
the beginning of an effort to define the scope of public accom-
modations. It is not necessarily more vague than the concept of
market has become, however, in the interpretations generated
by United States Jaycees and its progeny. Its touchstone is
whether norm-generating entities represent themselves as
broadly open to the public. If they do not, the exclusion of any
particular individual carries little meaning. If they do, how-
ever, exclusion becomes a marker, a badge of inferiority, as the
dissent noted in Dale.
B. APPLYING THE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP MODEL
Let us imagine a slight change in history: Reconstruction
did not end the same way. More justices sharing Justice
Harlan's philosophy were appointed to the Court. As a result,
the Civil Rights Cases were overruled, and the Court adopted
the Thirteenth Amendment reasoning that was the basis of
Justice Harlan's dissent. Although Justice Harlan did not re-
nounce the "social rights" discourse, he framed the issue as one
involving the full range of meaningful citizenship. It is a fair
inference that this interpretive model would later have formed
the basis for analysis of other civil rights statutes (as well as,
perhaps, Brown v. Board of Education2 6).
205. There is an argument that full and meaningful citizenship requires
not merely opportunity for economic advancement, but an assurance of eco-
nomic security. British sociologist T.H. Marshall developed a theory of "social
citizenship" that stresses the indispensability of "social rights" such as a basic
living standard, housing, and health care. See generally T.H. Marshall, Citi-
zenship and Social Class, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN AN-
THOLOGY 291, 291-319 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1997). The the-
ory provides an alternative frame for critiquing the shortcomings of formal,
legalistic definitions of citizenship. See id.
206. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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That, of course, did not happen. What did happen, how-
ever, was that in the wake of the Civil Rights Cases decision,
eighteen states 'enacted public accommodations statutes.207 Al-
though I do not contend that all of these laws must necessarily
be read today as endorsements of Justice Harlan's dissent and
as adoption of the citizenship analysis,2 08 I do argue that the
concept of social citizenship as an interpretive frame for public
accommodations statutes is valid, all the more so for those
statutes enacted specifically to repudiate the reasoning of the
Civil Rights Cases.
To pose the question of what direction such a sustained de-
velopment of the concept of citizenship in this context would
have taken is not to answer it.209 Certainly Justice Harlan
himself would not have extended civil rights laws to civic or-
ganizations at the turn of the last century. But had his dissent
been adopted by the Court, it would have initiated a set of
questions that were centered on the meaning of citizenship,
specifically in the context of public accommodations. At the
federal level, using the citizenship framework would require an
explicit repudiation of at least the Thirteenth Amendment por-
tion of the Civil Rights Cases.
No such dramatic reversal would be necessary at the state
level. Indeed, another major (and continuing) doctrinal border
established by the same Court was the tightly cabined scope of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In the Slaughter-House
Cases, the Court held that "fundamental citizenship" was de-
termined by the states, and only a specified bundle of rights
enumerated in the Constitution was protected by that clause as
a part of national citizenship.210
The voluminous commentary on the Slaughter-House
Cases and its progeny has centered on the proper scope of fed-
eral citizenship. What that body of law does as well, however,
is to paint the authority of states in broad strokes, giving them
enormous discretion to determine not only who are citizens of a
207. KONVrIz & LESKES, supra note 130, at 157.
208. The legislative histories of particular laws may vary, and subsequent
amendments may have altered the text in ways that would affect whether this
interpretive approach would be appropriate.
209. For a comprehensive political and historical analysis of the develop-
ment of the concepts of citizenship and "civic identity" through 1912, see gen-
erally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY (1997).
210. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77, 79-81 (1873).
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state, but what the concomitant operative effects of such citi-
zenship might be.211 It is, therefore, particularly open to state
legislatures and judges to think expansively about the meaning
of citizenship. That potential makes it especially ironic that
the states, many of which first enacted public accommodations
laws in order to fill a gap left by the federal government after
the invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, have so often
opted to extend that law only into the sorts of venues that the
much more limited federal authority is permitted to reach. It
renders all the more unfortunate the impulse by the Supreme
Court to enshrine those limits.
What is most critical, however, is answering the question
of what the society should seek to achieve by enacting public
accommodations laws. In both their historical context and in
contemporary social theory, they resonate most powerfully with
concepts of full participatory membership in those venues that
undertake to generate, in a broadly open and highly unselective
way, norms of citizenship. Habermas's concept of the public
sphere provides, at the least, a theoretical starting point for de-
veloping that conceptualization. 212
CONCLUSION
Statutes prohibiting discrimination in public accommoda-
tions comprise a continuously cutting edge of civil rights law.
They extend the mandate of equality beyond state action, be-
yond a right of political participation, and beyond the core ne-
cessities of employment and housing. They operate as the zon-
ing laws for democracy, creating boundaries for the reach of
public law into those institutions that Tocqueville, and many
others since, saw as forming defensive bulwarks against a coer-
cive state.213 They virtually define inclusion and exclusion in
civil society.
211. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 926 (1986) ("The
framers[] [of the Reconstruction Amendments'] understanding of citizenship
involved an important distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental
rights.... [Clontroversial rights [such as access to public accommodations] ...
were nonfundamental rights of state citizenship and were within the jurisdic-
tion of the states."). As to federal law, they were secured not directly by, but
through, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
213. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-14 (J.P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835).
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2001] ACCOMMODATING THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Legislators and judges should resist suggestions to solve
the kind of expressive association problem presented in Dale by
truncating the meaning of public accommodations. Instead,
courts need to examine much more carefully than the Supreme
Court did in Dale whether an organization's policy of excluding
persons with an identity characteristic protected by anti-
discrimination law is necessary to preserving the group's unity
of beliefs. And they should do so with an understanding that
public accommodations properly encompass more than the
market; the concept has from its inception shaped and been
shaped by our understandings of citizenship.
With regard to state institutions, equality law protects the
individual's right to meaningful participation in diverse institu-
tions that powerfully construct both citizen and self. One can
read Brown v. Board of Education,214 United States v. Vir-
ginia,215 and Romer v. Evans,216 for example, to that effect. In
public accommodations law, the United States Jaycees-Rotary
Club-New York State Club Assn 217 line of cases established the
threshold for exploring how to weave that principle into the law
as it affects broadly open, private institutions. Sadly, at least
for the moment, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale has cut short
that exploration.
214. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
215. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
216. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
217. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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